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How much would Greece’s creditors lose if the country were to exit the eurozone? 
  It  is  widely  assumed  that  an  exit  would  be  followed  by  a  default  because  the  new 
currency would depreciate so massively that debt service in euros would be impossible. 
This assumption is wrong. 
  Most  of  Greece’s  debt  is  foreign  debt  and  must  thus  ultimately  be  serviced  through 
higher exports or import compression. 
An exit followed by a massive depreciation of the new drachma should accelerate export 
growth and provoke a further fall in imports, thus increasing the capacity of the country to 
service its foreign debt. After a decade of adjustment, Greece might be able to pay its debts. 
What is the basis for the assumption that exit = default? 
At the present time, Greek GDP amounts to about €200 billion (per annum). If Greece were 
to (re-)introduce the drachma, the new currency would likely depreciate by about 50%, so 
that Greece’s GDP would fall probably to below €100 billion. The revenues of the Greek 
government would also fall in a similar proportion, from about €80 billion today to about €40 
billion  after  an  exit  from  the  euro.  These  meagre  resources  appear  totally  inadequate  to 
service the over €330 billion that the Greek government owes to its foreign creditors. 
Most of the country’s remaining debt is owed to official European creditors (principally the 
EFSF and the ECB). At first sight, it appears thus that the official foreign creditors would 
have to write off most of their claims on the country. (We leave aside here the €22 billion of 
claims the IMF has on Greece, which are indisputably senior and likely to be serviced in full.) 
However, after the initial overshooting, the exchange rate is likely to return to its longer-run 
equilibrium and growth is likely to resume, slowly closing the output gap. Experience with 
similar cases of emerging markets suggests that after ten years nominal GDP (measured in a 
hard currency) should return to at least its previous level, say about €200 billion. 
Moreover, exports do not necessarily fall with a devaluation. On the contrary, they are likely 
to grow by more than GDP (Borensztein & Panizza, 2010). This would increase over time the 
capacity of the country to service foreign debt. Exports might well double over a decade, 
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point the country might well be able to service its external debt, provided the interest rate is 
low enough. 
Table 1. Exposure to Greece, by country (€ billion) 
   Official (shares in EFSF/ECB)  Private (BIS data)  Total  % of GDP 
France  66.5  34.7  101  5.1 
Germany  88.6  10.5  99  3.9 
Italy  58.4  1.7  60  3.8 
Spain  38.9  0.7  40  3.7 
Netherlands  18.7  2.7  21  3.6 
Belgium  11.3  0.6  12  3.2 
Portugal  5.3  6.3  12  6.8 
Austria  9  1.8  11  3.6 
Finland  5.8  0.02  6  3.1 
Ireland  3.4  0.15  4  2.1 
TOTAL  306  59.42  366 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from BIS, ECB and EFSF. 
Private versus official debt default 
A Greek exit followed by the introduction of a drachma that depreciates by 50% might thus 
be  followed  by  the  following  scenario:  the  Greek  government  officially  defaults  on  its 
remaining obligations to private creditors and the Greek private sector will be largely unable 
to service its foreign debt. This implies that European banks will have to write off most of 
their  remaining  €70  billion  of  exposure  to  Greece  (and  given  that  the  banks  rely  on  the 
sovereign for their support, this implies essentially a corresponding loss for the governments 
as well). 
However, the official eurozone creditors can afford to take the long view and could agree to 
a standstill under the usual combination of ‘extend and pretend’. Let us assume that the 
official creditors grant a grace period of 10 years followed by a full repayment over the next 
20 years (the terms of the latest EFSF deal) and an interest rate of 1.5% (the rate on Bunds 
today).  Under  this  scenario  the  debt  service  of  the  country  (aggregating  the  Greek 
government’s obligations towards the EFSF and the debt of the banks towards the ECB) 
would be only about €6 billion per year, equivalent to 3% of GDP, hardly an unsustainable 
burden.  This  would  apply  in  particular  to  the  government,  whose  domestic  obligations 
would have been wiped out in the meantime. Moreover, the necessary transfer of resources 
to foreigners would amount only to about 6% of total export revenues, again not a heavy 
burden. Furthermore, as Greece’s GDP is likely to grow in nominal terms by much more 
than  1.5%,  the  debt  service  capacity  should  continue  to  improve  after  the  country  has 
adjusted to the new equilibrium. 
Of course, at first sight, an interest rate of 1.5% represents an extraordinary subsidy for a 
country whose existing bonds trade at yields above 25%, which would  imply in present 
value terms a haircut of over 80% through the rescheduling of the official debt. But these 
yields on private sector bonds are so high because all claims of the public sector have de 
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For the German government, however, an interest rate of 1.5% would just represent the cost 
it faces to refinance its claims on Greece and thus effectively entails no haircut at all. This 
implies immediately that if Greece were able to service its debt over 30 years at an interest 
rate of 1.5%, the German government might in the end not suffer any loss on its exposure. 
Table  2  below  shows  that  any  losses  for  Germany  would  come  from  the small,  residual 
exposure of German banks. 
However, most other eurozone governments would have to carry a substantial burden given 
that they face much higher refinancing costs. For example, Italy and Spain would have to 
participate in the rescheduling of Greek debt with an amount equivalent in terms of GDP 
similar to that of Germany (about 4% of GDP – see Table 1). But given that their refinancing 
costs are now over 6% per year, Spain and Italy would make a loss of about 60% (in present 
value terms) in the kind of operation described above (see Table 2 below). 
Table 2. Total fiscal loss (in € billion and as % of GDP) 
  
Loss on private 
exposure (loss rate 
75%) (€ billion) 
Present value of 
rescheduled 
debt* 
Loss on 
public debt 
(€ billion 
Total present 
value loss (€ 
billion) 
Total loss 
(% of 
GDP) 
France  26.1  0.757  16.2  42.2  2.1 
Germany  7.8  1.007  -0.6  7.2  0.3 
Italy  1.3  0.419  34.0  35.3  2.2 
Spain  0.5  0.400  23.3  23.8  2.2 
Netherlands  2.0  0.916  1.6  3.6  0.6 
Belgium  0.5  0.670  3.8  4.2  1.1 
Portugal  4.8  0.147  4.5  9.3  5.4 
Austria  1.4  0.814  1.7  3.1  1.0 
Finland  0.0  0.946  0.3  0.3  0.2 
Ireland  0.1  0.321  2.3  2.4  1.5 
*Calculated at present interest rates. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from BIS, ECB and EFSF. 
Table 2 also shows that the one country least able to withstand a further burden, namely 
Portugal, is also the one that would stand to lose the most, over 5% of GDP. 
The  irony  of  the  present  situation  is  that  the  one  country  that  has  the  largest  absolute 
exposure and that dictates much of the policy on Greece is also the one that in the end is 
likely  to  lose  the  least  (0.3%  of  GDP).  The  real  burden  of  a  Greek  exit  would  fall 
disproportionally on the weaker members of the eurozone, which would be hit by a ‘double’ 
whammy of the contagion effects and the direct fiscal costs, which for them would be ten 
times as high at about 2.2% of GDP. 
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